physical coercion. Mao understood this very well, as we see from what he is reported to have said in 1958 (see above), and the propaganda state was in full throttle until the end of the 1970s. Since then it has become increasingly difficult for the state to remain in control of all aspects of the flow of information and communications.
In his book After the Propaganda State, Daniel Lynch (1999) outlines a theoretical analysis of the changing role of the media in contemporary China that offers some guidance for the present study. In the transition away from orthodox socialism, China's leaders have rejected what might have been the most obvious strategies, based on what happened in socialist states elsewhere in the world (Castells, 2000; Pei, 1998a) . There is little evidence, for example, of a shift toward the creation of a liberal`public sphere' or a`civil society' that could ease the transition away from authoritarian rule. Even without such a transition, however, there have been a number of unanticipated challenges to the state's power in the reform era.
In the context of the media the most important of these challenges has been in the realm of economics. Changes in the material-incentive structures associated with the reforms have encouraged media outlets to produce news that will entertain their readers and earn them a profit through sales, while at the same time attracting advertisers. Newspapers already face stiff competition from radio, television, and electronic media outlets in China, but potential readers are also being enticed by the emergence of new newspapers. To secure and increase their market share, newspaper producers need to give careful consideration to what they print. As Lynch (1999) observes, once managers and editors become formally responsible for profits and losses, they have``strong incentives to increase advertising income by catering to audience demands'' (pages 7^8). It is at this point that the state and the media may find themselves in conflict, because what the press defines as`entertainment' the state may define as dangerous, both because it spreads`bourgeois/liberal' messages, and because it threatens to undermine the state's control over the media (Lee, 1990) .
The evidence also suggests that the regime's efforts to keep a lid on communications flows in China have been thwarted by the technological advancements associated with the`information age', and by the escalating trend toward global information broadcasting and cultural homogenization (Castells, 1998) . With the near-ubiquitous availability of electronic connectivity, authoritarian states find it increasingly difficult to monitor what their citizens read, hear, and watch (Lull, 1991) . Also working in the same direction is the spatial devolution of authority that has accompanied the reforms in China, as decisionmaking in all spheres of economic activity has been shifted down to lower levels. In the world of newspapers, the decentralization of decisionmaking to the city and county levels (and below) has resulted in administrative fragmentation that has made it increasingly difficult for Beijing to maintain regulatory power over the content of the media. As Lynch observes:``The sociopolitical effect of ... fragmentation is to multiply the number of points at which the Center must exercise power or authority... . By the mid-1990's, messages could easily be initiated and received throughout the system at numerous points over which the Center did not have direct jurisdiction '' (page 40) .
Another important consideration is in the realm of ideology. In the post-Mao era (after 1978) the reduced emphasis on traditional ideology meant that the Party/state was no longer so involved in the production and distribution of information. The regime still dominates the initiation and dissemination of the most sensitive political information, but in most other contexts its control is now being challenged on a regular basis. This results in what Lynch describes as a``cacophonous and unstructured circulation of communications messages'' (pages 5^6), which is typical of the chaotic political situation he describes as`public sphere praetorianism'. Applying the ideas put forward by Samuel Huntington, Lynch suggests that such a state of affairs is most likely to emerge during an era of very rapid economic growth, which has clearly been the case in China for almost two decades. In such circumstances sociopolitical transformation occurs more rapidly than political change, and in China this was reinforced by the state's refusal to allow any significant sharing of political power. Under such circumstances, the interests of newly formed social and business-oriented groups cannot be channelled in any legitimate direction, so to compete in politics they are forced to make use of whatever comparative advantage they have: entrepreneurs may pay bribes; workers may go on strike; military officers may stage coups; peasants may withhold their taxes or grain quotas; and students may demonstrate on the streets. If any combination of these outcomes is realized, the result could be extreme instability and chaos, which will continue until the state is able to restore control.
In traditional accounts of media reform, the propaganda state's loss of control would be accompanied by the transition to a`liberal' model of communications flows, in which individuals and groups freely create and circulate messages in a wellstructured and institutionalized`public sphere ' (Gunther and Mughan, 2000) . To the outside world it looked as if this was beginning to happen in China in the 1980's. Reform of the media was debated extensively and some small but significant policy changes were implemented (Sun, 2001 ). As we now know, the regime decided to put a halt to these liberalizing trends at the end of the 1980s, and with the crushing of the pro-democracy movement in 1989 the media reform movement also suffered a major setback. The Party attributed such movements to the pernicious influence of`bourgeois liberalization', which was seen as a deliberate strategy by Western societies to infiltrate and pollute China and its media with`liberal',`bourgeois', and`democratic' ideas.
In the early 1990s Party spokespersons publicly emphasized that the proper role of the media was to serve as the`mouthpiece' of the Party, as Mao had stipulated. In other words, the media should endeavor to arouse the people's confidence in and support for the socialist system. In addition to the official discourse, a variety of new measures were introduced: media outlets that were too outspoken in their criticisms of the regime were closed down; censorship was tightened up in all branches of the industry; and journalists and editors thought to be sympathetic to the democracy movement were subjected to investigation, job reassignment, or even imprisonment. The retrenchment was successful, and the state was able to restore its position at the helm. By the early 1990s, according to China scholar-cum-journalist Yuezhi Zhao (1998) ,``Party control was tighter than during the Cultural Revolution'', and although this may have been an overstatement, her research demonstrated that the content of Chinese newspapers at that time was still``monolithic, positive, and highly predictable'' (pages 48^49). In other words, even with the far-reaching impacts of the economic reforms, and after more than a decade of debate about press freedom, the reform of China's media was barely off the ground in the early 1990s. The leading news items in the papers and on television were familiar to any student of Chinese media throughout the socialist era (before 1978) . The press focused almost exclusively on such issues as policy directives from provincial and national leaders, visits of Party leaders to various cities and provinces, and stories about`model' villages and citizens in different parts of China. This paper explores the extent to which this situation had changed by the beginning of the new millennium. The state was still calling the shots in the early 1990s, but running parallel to the constrictions placed on the media at this time was an acceleration of the economic reforms after Deng Xiaoping's much heralded tour of south China in 1992 (Naughton, 2000) . It seems likely that the speeding up of the reform process throughout the 1990s would have an impact on China's media providers and producers. Many newspapers, even some provincial Party outlets, had already lost their state subsidies, and by 1992 one third had achieved financial independence, relying primarily upon sales and advertising for their revenues. To make this shift more palatable to the conservative wing of the Party, the push toward commercialization was couched in familiar socialist language: because the economic base was being transformed from`plan' to`market', the media system should also be transformed to make it compatible with the economic base (Naughton, 1995) . The news was now to be thought of as a commodity; and instead of being an agent of propaganda, news production was now considered to be an industry. The implication was that the press, instead of`leading the masses', should now actively`serve the consumers' (Zhao, 1998) .
Under such circumstances we might reasonably expect to see further examples of the`praetorianism' that Lynch has described, appearing in the Chinese media by the end of the 1990s. The objective of the research described in this paper was to search for such examples in the daily newspapers of some of China's biggest cities. To narrow the focus of investigation a search was conducted for news items that would, under normal circumstances, be considered`controversial' and liable to state censorship. For this purpose stories were selected that reported evidence of dissatisfaction and discontent with the reform policies and their outcomes.
Modernization and its discontents
China's modernization project is usually portrayed as the world's most successful transition from revolutionary socialism to developmentalist capitalism (Castells, 2000) , so we might begin here by asking ask why it is necessary to explore the`other' side of the story. Echoing the feelings of many outside academics and reporters, economist Thomas Rawski (1996) maintains that the reform policies propelled China to the summit of the world's growth charts, with rapid and virtually uninterrupted expansion measured on all indicators of economic and social development. Rawski claims that China's reforms``produced no readily identifiable groups of losers whose income and material welfare have declined'' (page 188). Although this assertion is technically accurate, it is misleading because Rawski says nothing about relative rates of income growth in different parts of China, or about the negative side effects of rapid economic development. In global terms capitalism has been the development strategy of choice around the world, especially in the former socialist states, which perhaps accounts for the sort of economic imperialism exhibited by Rawski. But after more than two decades of fast-paced capitalism in China, it is reasonable to ask some other questions, not so much about the power of capitalism to create new wealth, but about its habit of consuming cultures, destroying environments, generating inequalities, and upsetting population dynamics (Gates, 1996; Pred, 1992) .
In spite of the overwhelming narrative of success, there are some aspects of the reform process we would expect the regime in Beijing to be less eager to publicize, and a look at the literature suggests two interrelated sets of issues. The first of these is actually an entire bundle of concerns that can be summarized under the heading of reform-induced problems'. Entrepreneurs complain, for example, about the limitations placed on them by the partial reform of the economy; migrant workers attracted to the cities by the lure of jobs are forced to live in squalid and dangerously makeshift housing; and cultural critics worry about the long-term consequences of the almost total commercialization of cultural production (Wang, 1996) . As China went through its extraordinary transformation, some of the nonsalutary outcomes of the reform era received attention in the media, with a focus on such issues as increasing income disparity, rising prevalence of crime and social disorder, and environmental destruction and resource depletion (Becker, 2000; Goldman and McFarquhar, 1999) .
Another problem that has recently been featured is the growth of unemployment in the mainland, as illustrated by a report in the Hong-Kong-based English language newspaper, the South China Morning Post:`M easures for the`newly' unemployed have been introduced to assist more than three million laid-off workers due to leave re-employment centres this month. The Labour and Social Security Ministry has launched a campaign to urge local governments to create jobs or extend help to laid-off workers soon to leave retraining centres and warned that bleak job prospects, surging unemployment and sporadic outbreaks of industrial unrest are among the country's most pressing problems'' ). There has been no shortage of reporting on issues such as these in the West, with many of the stories told by journalists like Jasper Becker (2000) or independent scholars like Gordon Chang (2001), whose recent book, The Coming Collapse of China, has documented a wide range of existing and future problems that (Chang thinks) cannot be solved. Similar reports have also appeared in China, for example, the expose written by He Qinglian (China's Pitfall 1998), which was published and officially endorsed in spite of its highly controversial nature. Information about these sorts of issues is coming out of China in many different contexts. Experienced outside observers öand in some cases even more casual visitors like journalists, travel writers, and tourists ö can gather such information with surprising ease, so news reports and feature stories based on this evidence have become commonplace.
The origin of these news items presumably lies within China, but what is actually reported is probably a distillation of the`facts', heavily colored by the ideological stance of those doing the reporting. This is most obviously the case for the reports released by dissident organizations, which are often staffed by political exiles from China whose explicit purpose is to be critical of the current regime. In the case of Western media sources like newspapers and television the bias may be more subtle, depending on the overall goals and ownership of media outlets in question. It is easy to hypothesize an ideological goal lying not too far below the surface of most of the significant China reports appearing in the Western media over the last few years (Fewsmith, 2000) . Although this phenomenon has been particularly evident since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it is in fact part of a more generalized process of`demonization' of China that has been commonplace in the Western media throughout the 20th century. As Jeffrey Wasserstrom (2000) has shown, over the longer course of history this process appears to be cyclical in nature, with the`big bad China' theme of recent years replacing what had, during the 1980s, been a considerably softer image of China.
A second category of issues likely to be related to dissatisfaction with the economic reforms involves public`acts of resistance' in contemporary China. In the context of informal politics, an`act of resistance' implies an action taken by individuals or groups in reaction to domination or oppression; in other words, resistance involves an attempt to cope with or alter the existing relationships of power (Pile, 1997; Pratt, 2000) . Resistance occurs across a wide spectrum: it is most apparent in overt acts, for example, when individuals or groups demonstrate in public places; but it is also found offstage', in symbolic acts, and in cultural productions, including works of art and fiction. Resistance is of particular interest to human geographers because it represents a form of refusal or opposition to existing power structures, and as such it necessarily takes place through specific geographies; indeed, as Stephen Pile (1997) remarks, resistance often occurs``in the spaces under the noses of the oppressor'' (page 12). Resistance is present in a multitude of everyday spaces, and geographers working within these new frameworks argue that by focusing on such locations it becomes possible to open up new and important ways of conceptualizing the relationship between resistance and power [see, for example, the collections edited by Pile and Keith (1997) and by Sharp et al (2000) ].
From the existing literature on the subject, it appears there are two main branches of resistance activity, both of which may be occurring in contemporary China: one leading to the formation of`social movements', which attempt to achieve transformative social goals; the other leading less ambitiously in the direction of what can broadly be referred to as`cultural politics', with resistant subjects attempting to`author' or create identities for themselves that are beyond the reach of the state and other dominant groups (Castells, 1998; Soja, 1996) . From the work that has been conducted thus far in China, an important distinction can also be made between`ordinary' resistance, in which individuals and groups seek redress for``routine instances of injustice for which the government and its agents are responsible'' (Pei, 2000, page 25) ; and`dissident' resistance, which is more likely to be indirect, conducted in creative and sometimes quite sophisticated ways, and often with recourse to the legal system.
Reading between the lines of the reports coming out of China, it is realistic to assume that the individuals and groups involved in`acts of resistance' are attempting to secure their place in the social order, presumably because they feel their status and ways of life are in jeopardy. In contemporary China such acts are most likely to be characteristic of people who are (or perceive themselves to be) the`losers' as a result of economic development. The underlying causes of such actions may be some form of denunciation of reform-induced hardships, such as falling incomes, rising unemployment, and the perception of a declining quality of life resulting from such diverse events as price inflation, air pollution, or overcrowded housing (Perry and Selden, 2000) . In some cases we might expect to find that public acts of resistance in China are grounded in a more widespread but usually amorphous sense of moral outrage, with individuals and groups criticizing local officials, for example, over what is perceived to be the state's dereliction of responsibility for the well-being of its citizens (Perry, 1999; 2002) . Widening the focus at this point, especially in light of the recent literature dealing with the geography of resistance (Pile and Keith, 1997; Sharp et al, 2000) , we might expect to find resistance activities occurring in a number of circumstances in contemporary China. In the countryside there have been numerous reports of rural workers reacting to situations in which apparently excessive and unfair taxes are being levied, or to other perceived injustices, such as being`paid' in IOUs instead of real currency. In the cities we would expect a response from urban workers reacting negatively to unemployment and income loss, to the erosion of the`iron-rice-bowl' benefits provided by state enterprises, or to a general decline in workplace conditions. In China's cities a variety of`subaltern' groups are also threatening to make their presence felt through`acts of resistance', most visibly the new migrants from the countryside (the`floating populations') who are often living and working precariously in and around China's biggest cities (Zhang, 2001 ). Many of the`floaters' are threatened by further exclusion and marginalization, and may attempt to have their`voice' heard in public (Dutton, 1998) . Although the traditional wisdom among studies of migrant groups suggests that newcomers are usually apolitical, we might expect this to change in the near future. It is generally argued that workers in the export-oriented factoriesö for example, in the Special Economic Zone cities in south Chinaöare unlikely to voice their discontent, either verbally or in overt acts, because of the potentially huge pool of workers eager to step in as replacements; but as some China scholars have suggested recently, there may be limits to the amount of injustice and discontent even the most underprivileged workers will endure (Solinger, 1999) . In addition to migrant groups, we might also anticipate resistance from the traditionally oppressed groups in China, most notably women and ethnic minorities, who have recently benefited to some extent from the internationalization of their struggles. The reforms have generated newly aggrieved populations, such as the workers in inefficient state-owned urban enterprises which are now in danger of being shut down or downsized; as well as workers in export-oriented factories, where workplace conditions and terms of employment may be less than optimal, as Anita Chan (2001) has recently observed in her book China's Workers Under Assault.
In liberal democracies the autonomous activities of individuals and groups within society, including`acts of resistance', can be channeled through the various institutions of`civil society', such as opposition political parties, independent trade unions, and a wide array of self-governing bodies. In China these institutions either do not exist or they are in fledgling form only (White, 1996) , which explains why traditionally lowstatus groups like peasants have taken to the streets and public squares as a way of getting their voices heard. Reports of many such acts reach the West; for example, the China Reform Monitor provided the following report in the Spring of 2001:`S ome 600 police officers fired into a crowd of destitute farmers protesting forced taxes and official corruption in the village of Yunxing in southern Jiangxi province ... . At least two people were killed and many others were wounded. A series of recent clashes have been reported throughout China between authorities and farmers, who say their tax burden is too heavy and accuse local officials of wasting public money'' (China Reform Monitor 2001). What happened in Jiangxi was not an isolated incident; during the last decade numerous events that can be classified as acts of resistance have been reported all over China (Pei, 2000) . A reading of the recent academic literature [see, for example, the collection edited by Perry and Selden (2000) ], in addition to a wide variety of foreign newspapers and online news services, shows that public`acts of resistance' are commonplace in China, and are manifested in a range of locally based protests, including demonstrations and sit-ins that are largely peaceful, all the way to full-scale riots and clashes with the police and other forces.
As is the case for reports about general dissatisfaction with the reforms, stories about public`acts of resistance' in China may exhibit a number of biases among those doing the reporting, but for the purposes of this study it is necessary to suspend judgment on this issue. The primary purpose here is not to explore the nature of Western writing and reporting about China, but to examine the extent to which similar reportingöfocusing on the`downside' of China's modernization projectöis also occurring in China. Is it possible, in other words, to determine whether the Chinese are reading about and seeing these same (or similar) messages in their newspapers? Or, are these reports simply the words and images of transnational (`Western') liberal reporters and newsmakers eager to hasten the demise of Communist Party rule in China?
Methodology
The objective of the study is to explore the extent to which newspapers in China are publishing stories of a`controversial' and`sensitive' nature; stories that would probably have been censored by the Party/state in the relatively recent past, as the research conducted by Zhao (1998) would indicate. Unfortunately, in the absence of a similar study to the one described here, conducted in the early 1990s, it is not possible to make precise comparisons over time, so the present project can aspire only to describe the contemporary situation. The study will, however, establish a benchmark for future studies, to monitor changes in news reporting throughout the first decade of the new millennium. The press has been chosen as the target for this study because it is relatively easy and inexpensive to analyze the print media in China through the use of hardcopy and electronic newspapers. Although it is recognized that other branches of the media may already have a significant share of the news market in Chinaöpartic-ularly television and, increasingly, the Internetöit would be a mistake to underestimate the power of the printed word in China (Gilley, 2001) . The economic reform era has witnessed a huge increase in the number of newspapers being published, and this has been matched by a corresponding growth in readership, related perhaps in equal parts to the new availability, the new purchasing power, and the overall increase in literacy rates during the last two decades (Tang and Parish, 2000) .
News items reporting on the two sets of issues discussed above were selected: (a) those reporting problems or unanticipated negative effects associated with the economic reforms; and (b) those describing public`acts of resistance'. There are many available sources that could be used to generate the required inventory; in fact the major problem here is not one of quantity, but quality. Until recently most of what we knew about events occurring inside China was based on academic research findings and the traditional media, including reports in foreign magazines, newspapers, and television or film productions (Unger, 2000) . To gather the information needed for these stories individual researchers and reporters have often needed to work surreptitiously in China, and some of them may have to operate virtually`under cover'. Over the last few years, however, the pool of available information about China has expanded, with interesting and sometimes very revealing coverage news items in a wide assortment of electronic locations. Many of the world's major newspapers now have online versions that are easy (and often free) to access for current daily news; and some of them also have pay-per-use archive services to locate news items from the recent past. In addition to newspapers there are dozens (maybe hundreds) of Internet sites around the world providing information about China, although they vary enormously in content, quality, and point of view (Smith, 2001) .
To generate what amounts to a`Western' inventory of China news items, three English-language media outlets with overlapping content were selected: the China News Digest, the China Reform Monitor, and the South China Morning Post. Arguably, each of these sources has its own specific preconceptions and built-in bias about contemporary China, but for the purpose of identifying an inventory of controversial topics, it is precisely that quality which makes them suitable sources for this study. The China News Digest (CND: www.cnd.org) is probably the most widely subscribed-to electronic journal providing summary news and discussion about contemporary China. CND offers``independent news about China'', and publishes special editions in most regions of the world, as well as a separate global edition, a Chinese-language edition, and a chat room: CND Forum.
When evaluating electronic sites in this context it is helpful to know in advance something about obvious sources of bias. At one end of the spectrum, for example, we can easily locate websites written entirely by Chinese dissidents living in exile; at the other end would be sites devoted to pointing out and criticizing the negative portrayals of China in the world media. At a location somewhere between these two extremes are sites operated by or under the auspices of governments around the world that are ideologically opposed to some of China's policies. One of these is the China Reform Monitor (CRM: www.afpc.org/crmmain.html), which is associated with the American Foreign Policy Council. The CRM provides summaries of newspaper and magazine articles about China, with a heavy orientation to foreign policy issues, but with some fairly critical analysis of China's domestic policies.
To increase the range and the quantity of China news reporting for the Western inventory, the third source selected was an English-language newspaper from Hong Kong, which, after the`handover' in 1997, held the unusual status of being both an`internal' and an`external' China resource. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) has a daily China component that is two or three pages in length, consisting of news items written by reporters who appear to have exceptionally good access to China and Chinese sources, as well as editorials. Before 1997 the SCMP was considered to be the`establishment' newspaper in Hong Kong because of its close ties to the British government; but in recent times there is evidence pointing in the other direction, with reports that the paper has gradually been tightening up on its reporters and editors, in an attempt to alter its traditional`anti-China' image. Over a six-month period (August 2000 to January 2001) all reports from and editorials about China published in these three Western sources were examined and analyzed for content, and were grouped under a variety of subheadings in the two categories discussed earlier. In selecting items for the inventory, all news reports and editorials dealing with contemporary China were considered, regardless of their length and content; the criterion for inclusion for each item was that it described or discussed a situation associated with reform-induced problems, or that it provided details about public`acts of resistance' in China. No attempt is made to evaluate thè quality' or depth of the news items, and, although some of them are based on situations in which reporters interviewed local people, it is not possible here to assess the seriousness of the problems or the level of discontent involved. For ease of presentation the news reports from the three Western sources have been grouped into a small number of categories (see table 1), although many of the news items contain multiple issues that are overlapping. With the inventory established, a search was then conducted for news items during the same time period on the same topics in the major daily newspapers of Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Guangzhou. The study analyzed stories carried in the daily editions of the four mainland cities, plus a fifth newspaper, the Southern Weekend, which was included because of its reputation for editorial independence and its track record of reporting honestly and factually about events that most mainland news editors would consider too risky to publish.
Analysis of the mainland newspapers was conducted by Chinese research assistants, working in the archives of the University Services Center at the Chinese University in Hong Kong. (1) The training continued over an extensive trial period, until it was evident that all of the assistants were able to identify the inventory of news items reported in the three Western sources (the SCMP, the CND, and the CRM ). In a subsequent training session the principal investigator and the research assistants met to discuss each story in detail, to ensure that it covered the topic in question. Before the analysis began, several issues of the five newspapers were scanned to determine the accuracy with which each of the student research assistants was able to identify relevant stories, and also to ensure interrater reliability (to guarantee that each of the assistants would identify similar stories if they were given the same issues of the newspapers). Once the training was complete, each of the assistants focused on one of the mainland newspapers for the time period in question, and prepared a translation of the story title and a brief summary of its content. A combined`frequency of reporting' scale was constructed by assigning scores for each category of news item in the mainland papers. For each news item the scale ranged from 1 through 5, with 1 no reporting at all, in any of the mainland newspapers, during the six months of the study; 2 one or two stories in total, with minimum detail; 3 three or four stories overall (which means that no stories appeared in at least two of the mainland papers); 4 five or more stories overall, with at least one of the mainland newspapers carrying no stories; 5 all five newspapers carrying at least one story and/or editorial, with some repeat stories in the same and subsequent editions.
Observations Reform-induced problems
For the six months of the study the most frequently occurring category of news items in the Western sources can be grouped broadly under the subheading of externality effects, and, although there was a great variety in the focus of this reporting, all of the issues covered can arguably be considered to be negative side effects of the reform policies. The news items can be further subdivided into four subcategories:`social',`urban',`rural', and environmental' externality effects. In the broadest possible terms the concerns described in these news items are related to the all-out push for economic development in China (1) Using the resources available at the University Services Center (USC) has the obvious advantage of allowing the research to be conducted in Hong Kong, without extensive fieldwork being conducted in the mainland. For a limited budget project this is obviously an attractive feature, but there are some drawbacks, most notably the variety of the newspapers available at the USC facility. In this project the daily newspapers in the cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Guangzhou were selected, even though these papers serve primarily as`mouthpiece' outlets for the Party/state in these cities. It would have been very helpful to conduct parallel studies using the more popular`evening' dailies in these cities, which we might expect to be more concerned with issues of readership and profit, and therefore offering a better test of the hypothesis put forward in this paper. Unfortunately, copies of the`evening' papers for all of these cities were not available at the USC facility during the time the study was conducted. In other words, using the official dailies offers a stricter test of the hypothesis, because under normal circumstances they are likely to be more conservative (read,`following the Party-line') than the`evening' papers. during the past two decades. One type of story that was common dealt with declining economic opportunities in different parts of the countryside, looking at issues of local poverty, rising geographical inequality, and out-migration from the more remote areas. As the following story from the CND indicates, this remains a major concern for the regime:`T he poorest segment of Chinese society continues to struggle with poverty, and many formerly impoverished families are slipping back into destitution ... . Director of the Poverty Relief Office under the State Council, Liu Fuhe, told the Xinhua News Agency that the government's anti-poverty campaign is focusing on sustaining income levels in the country. According to official statistics, there are 42 million people in China with family incomes which fall below the poverty line, set at between 500 to 750 yuan per year depending on the region. Those below the poverty line are eligible for government assistance. To prevent families from slipping back into poverty, the government has decided to maintain subsidies to poor counties even after the average income of their inhabitants rises above the poverty line'' (9 November 1999). From a reading of such reports one might be tempted to conclude that for many rural dwellers conditions have worsened (in a relative sense) during the reform years, as the bulk of new development has occurred in the coastal regions and in and around China's largest cities (Wang and Hu, 1999) .
The first group of`social' externality effects is the largest and most diverse; in fact the news items can be further subdivided into concerns about health and health care; welfare problems; legal issues; and social problems or policy issues. In some of the news items reported in the Western sourcesöincluding the selling of infected blood, the trafficking of women and girls, the production of illegal drugs, and the blackmarket sale of body partsöit is tempting to hypothesize a direct relationship between such events and the increasingly profit-driven climate that is a feature of China's reform era. In other cases the link may be indirect, as with stories about homelessness and the emergence of street children in many cities across China. It is likely that high rates of rural out-migration have resulted in a shortage of adequate housing for both adult and children migrants in the cities and towns; in addition to which the overall decline in publicly supported welfare provision indicates that the state is now offering considerably less social support to the needy than was the case in the past.
An indirect link might also be assumed between other social and health concerns and the pace of China's modernization. This is most likely in the case of the increasing incidence of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases in both the cities and the countryside, which is thought to be related to circular patterns of migration (Gu, 2001; He, 2000) . Another important area of concern includes the mistreatment of women and female children, including rape and abduction. Some researchers have linked the high prevalence of sexual abuse to the rising tide of misogyny associated with the one-child policy, but there is also a concern about the growing commercialization of sex in China, which has been interpreted as an indirect consequence of the market reforms (Dikotter, 1998; Lu, 1993; . Coverage of these issues was much less frequent in the mainland papers than it was in the Western sources, and it is difficult to know how to interpret this observation. On the one hand, it may demonstrate that editorial policies on the mainland allow only passing mention of such serious issues, although this contradicts what has been reported by some China scholars (Evans, 1997) . It is also possible that some media sources in the West tend to overreport on such issues, maybe as a way of increasing market share in terms of readership (Anagnost, 1997) .
Within the subcategory of`urban' impacts there are news items about unemployment and peoples' fears of being laid-off. Other employment-related concerns reported include hazardous workplace conditions, including industrial explosions and fires, and, most notably in the study period, accidents in mines all over China, with gas explosions and collapsing structures causing serious damage and loss of life (Becker, 2001) . Closely related to such concerns are reports about deficiencies in China's infrastructure, which is manifested in frequent accidents encountered in several sectors of the economy, especially in the rapidly expanding transportation system. During the last decade there have been an enormous number of serious bus, train, and ferryboat accidents all across China. Another area of concern has been accidents at construction sites and the collapse of recently completed buildings, as was the case in the disaster at the Dongguan shopping mall, in the Pearl River Delta, in December 2000.
Situations such as these are perhaps to be expected in an economy that is being restructured at full speed, with stupendous rates of growth in many different sectors at once. Industrial, commercial, and infrastructural development has been occurring at a breakneck pace in many regions of China, and often the speed of the changes means the new construction is way ahead of the imposition of reasonable safety standards and building codes. In some cases, investigations have pointed to incidents of corruption and bribery that have resulted in dangerous construction or slipshod procedures that ignore the existing legal codes of conduct. Another frequent concern is the intense desire in many sectors to increase production or service rapidly, in the interests of profit maximization. As some of the newspaper and electronic reports suggest, in such circumstances managers may be cutting corners and taking unnecessary risks, sometimes with fatal consequences.
News reports about the`rural' externality effects were commonplace in the Western sources, and they frequently commented on worsening economic and social conditions in the countryside, often focusing on specific locales where poverty has been deepening. Underlying many of the stories is a statementöimplicit or explicitöabout the rising level of spatial inequality in China, with the cities and coastal regions getting richer while the rural areas get poorer. Some of the news items concentrate on the failure of the state to respond quickly enough to the plight of the rural poor; while others examine the failures of specific policies that were put into place. In some stories this theme was punctuated by reports about the regime's ongoing plans to deal with the issue of regional inequality, often focusing on the all-out push to encourage economic development in the periphery, and especially in China's far-western territories.
The coverage of the urban and rural issues in the five mainland newspapers shows there was reasonably widespread reporting throughout, although it varied from one city to another. There were news items in all of the inventoried categories in the mainland newspapers; but on some important issues, such as unemployment and job layoffs, there were only two reports overall, with none at all featured in the Beijing and Chongqing daily papers. Of the five newspapers surveyed, the Southern Weekend's coverage of the urban externality issues was thinner than that of the others, perhaps because it is a weekly paper. Its`parent' newspaper in Guangzhou, however, the Southern Daily, carried a large number of news items (16) describing what is categorized here as urban externality concerns; with the other major city papers carrying less than half that number over the six-month period. Reporting on reform externalities in China's rural areas was also quite prevalent in the mainland papers, with news items in all of those sampled, and with all of the inventoried categories covered. Perhaps it is not surprising to find that the least coverage of rural issues was in the Beijing Daily (5, overall); but the Southern Weekend regularly featured such news items (22, overall), which seems to fit with its image as a newspaper that was, at that time, considered to be more`daring' when it came to reporting or editorializing on politically sensitive issues.
The last group of externality effects includes news items about some of thè environmental' consequences of the reform policies, including reports about specific pollution accidents and ecological hazards, as well as general statements made about the growing seriousness of China's environmental problems. Also included in this category were weather-related issues such as drought and flood, and extreme cases of cold or hot weather. Although these issues cannot be attributed to any state policies, in some cases the news stories included commentary on the timeliness of government reactions to such hazards. Comparing the coverage observed in the Western sources with that in the mainland newspapers shows that for the most part there is not a lot of difference. Stories about the environment are certainly considered to be newsworthy in contemporary China, as they are elsewhere. The frequency of such news items suggests that mainland editors may be keen to keep environmental issues in public view, and that the Party/state has recognized the need for strong words and determined actions (Smil, 2000) .
Another frequently reported news item in the inventory generated from the three Western sources describes incidents of corruption in China, and the rising rate of crime, especially economic crimes such as smuggling and embezzlement. Some China scholars have suggested a direct causal relationship between rising rates of corruption and crime and the reform policies, and certainly with the general climate of opinion and changing values associated with commercialization and the profit motive that is currently driving most public behaviors (Kwong, 1997; Zha, 1995; . It appears that the present regime is committed to rooting out the widespread and growing problem of corruption among officials, even at the highest level. The extended push in this direction, which amounts to an all-out campaign to expose corruption and punish the perpetrators, suggests that the leaders in Beijing feel a continuing push in this direction will generally win them public support.
As table 1 shows, most of the corruption and crime themes reported in the three external sources were also reported in the mainland newspapers, although the depth of coverage was variable. The news items in this category most frequently carried in the mainland were editorials about the need to stamp out official corruption, which we can assume results from orders passed down from above. One of the subcategories that is not covered simultaneously on the mainland was reporting about corruption among birth-control officials. Bearing in mind the continuing importance attached to this policy in Beijing, this absence may be a result of editorial policies muzzling such stories (Mittenthal and Wu, 2000) . Overall, none of the mainland papers focused excessively on the very high-profile corruption cases occurring in China during the period in question. Again it may be possible that in the mainland the desire to sell newspapers with lurid accounts of bribery, murder, and extortion, is not as well developed as it is in Hong Kong or elsewhere in the world. It is also conceivable that Western news outlets (including those in Hong Kong) are tryingöthrough negative coverageöto persuade Beijing to tighten up on the extreme lawlessness that appears to be rampant in the some of the most rapidly growing urban areas of China (Pei, 1998b) .
It is not surprising to discover that journalists contributing to the Western sources wrote frequently about the incompleteness of the reforms in China (see table 1 ). It is difficult to interpret what lies behind such stories, because they suggest different types of policies; some favor pro-growth strategies, but others argue for more cautious development. It is plausible that underlying the demand for further reform might be the view that the reforms have been too conservative and too limited in scope. The other set of concerns appears to be diametrically opposed to further unrestricted and unplanned growth. In general the calls for further reform among the inventoried news items fall into four distinct categories: (1) the need for further economic reform policies, including increases in technological investment and infrastructural development; (2) the call for more effective urban planning, greater efforts to protect the environment, and more thought about how to promote sustainable development; (3) the perceived need for additional social reforms, in a wide array of contexts; and (4) a call for further legal reforms to complement what has already occurred, and to bring an end to some of the undesirable consequences of the reform era, such as counterfeit production, rising crime rates, and cases of land and tax fraud. Other categories include the perceived need for significant reforms in China's health care system and its welfare policies, both of which may be related to the expressed and visible need to provide for individuals and groups who are being further marginalized in China's era of rapid economic expansion.
During the time period of this study the Shanghai Daily featured a number of stories dealing with the first two of the above subcategories, especially the environmental problem, as did the Southern Daily (Guangzhou); but the Chongqing Daily had nothing to say on any of the issues. In general, the mainland papers did not report much about the need for health care and welfare reform; but the issue of legal reform was clearly a popular topic on the mainland, with multiple news items carried in all but one of the papers surveyed (the Chongqing Daily). It may well be that such stories are popular because they substantiate the anticrime and corruption campaigns that are currently in vogue, and are therefore not likely to be expunged by the regime's censors.
Public`acts of resistance'
The China coverage in the three Western news sources included references to a wide range of public`acts of resistance' during the six months of the study (table 2) . No attempt has been made to assess the seriousness of any of the reported acts, or to provide a follow-up of them to determine what actions, if any, were taken, or how they were resolved. The`acts of resistance' are listed under the following categories: industrial worker issues, which are usually centered on the urban workplace; rural worker issues, usually occurring in the villages and small towns of the countryside; environmental conflicts (which are about equally like to occur in urban as rural settings); locational (land-use) conflicts; and`dissident' issues. The last three categories shown in table 2 include issues associated with specific groups (or individuals) that have been officially identified by the state as potentially disruptive of the social order, or a direct threat to the regime. Most significantly included here are reports about the activities of groups that have been declared illegal or`counterrevolutionary', including Falun Gong practitioners, the China Democratic Party, various trade unions, as well as entities that are in fundamental opposition to the state, especially those considered to have`separatist' goals, which includes groups operating in ethnic minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang.
Although the Western inventory generated a wide array of news items describing public`acts of resistance' in China, a parallel survey of the coverage in the mainland newspapers shows that reporting on these (or similar) events in China was sparse. Only occasionally was there any coverage of such acts in the newspapers surveyed in this study, and in most cases it is no more than a few lines of matter-of-fact reporting. Only one of the newspapers (Beijing Daily) carried a story about urban workplace grievances and associated activities; one paper (Chongqing Daily) featured a story about environmental conflicts; and two papers (Shanghai Daily and Beijing Daily) provided reports of conflicts in localities where new construction plans were scheduled to destroy or damage existing residential neighborhoods. None of the mainland papers covered any of the stories about bombing attacks in various parts of China, even though there is reason to believe this has become a popular form of resistance in China. The SCMP, for example, covered a number of bombing stories during the six months of the study, including suicide attacks, although in none of the cases reported was it possible to connect the bombings with any dissident group in China (Ma, 2000) .
The only public`acts of resistance' that were comprehensively covered during this period were stories about Falun Gong, which were almost invariably accompanied by editorials reporting the official line about the illegality of such groups, and encouraging citizens not to have anything to do with them. During the six months of the study there was only one brief story mentioning the China Democratic Party; but none at all dealing with trade union activities. There was some mention in the mainland newspapers of individual dissidents, but this was restricted to official reports and editorials about the exiled Chinese poet, Gao Xingjian, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in the latter part of the year 2000.
Discussion and future research directions
In drawing out some conclusions from this exploratory research, it is important to begin with an interpretation of the major findings, conducted in part by comparing the coverage in the three Western sources with that in the five mainland newspapers. This leads naturally into a discussion of the implications of the findings as they pertain to press reform issues in China. A final issue is a discussion of some of the directions in which this line of research can go, and how it could be extended, in theoretical and empirical terms.
Interpreting the findings
The primary objective of the empirical study reported in this paper was to explore the extent to which the content of news reporting in China's big city newspapers has changed during the 1990s. The context for this exploration of the print media in China lies in the nature of the reform process itself. The economic reforms have resulted in significant changes in almost all aspects of life, and it is reasonable to assume that China's newspapers have changed with the times as well. As Lynch (1999) has suggested, the state now finds it much more difficult to maintain absolute control over the content of the media. Economic decisionmaking has shifted downwards, away from the center, and the emphasis on traditional Marxist ideology has been diminished. Although we would expect to see little change in the official media outlets associated with the central government, it is plausible that city (and lower level) newspapers, operating to some extent beyond the reach of the central state, might make their editorial decisions based largely on considerations of readership and profits. The Chinese press is more diverse and active today than at any time in the history of the People's Republic, and competition for readers has increased sharply as the number of newspapers has expanded. The most important force for change has been financial, in that newspapers now have to rely almost exclusively on advertising revenue to support themselves, as the economy has turned increasingly to the market and as the government has withdrawn its media subsidies. Consistent with what is happening in so many areas of life in contemporary China, it would be realistic to assume that local newspaper editors are now scrambling to boost sales, gain new readers, and expand advertising revenues. If this is the case, we can expect to see city newspapers headlining interesting and controversial stories to attract new readers, while at the same time excluding or sidelining the traditional state-initiated propaganda messages and news reports. This paper has offered some very exploratory findings based on an examination of newspaper reporting in mainland China. Using three Western media sources it was possible to generate an inventory of reports and editorials directly or indirectly related to the`downside' of the economic reforms. By investigating the news reporting in five mainland newspapers during the same period, it is apparent that many of the same themes were being reported, although the coverage overall tends to be thinner and less detailed, and some events and situations are not reported at all. The mainland newspapers sampled here are less likely to report on reform-induced urban and rural problems, and in many categories they have no coverage at all. The major exceptions to this appear to be news items about transportation accidents and rural poverty issues, which are reasonably well covered in the mainland papers.
The coverage of social issues in the mainland papers (the`social externalities' of reform), shows that stories appeared in most of the inventoried categories, the major exceptions being stories about China's prison camps and detention centers, illegal (out-)migration into Hong Kong, and the traffic in body parts. None of the mainland newspapers emerged as a particular champion of social problems issues, although the Southern Daily in Guangzhou carried a number of stories reporting the need for restructuring in the delivery of health care services in China. In some instances specific social issues were targeted in news reports, with cognate reports running in several subsequent issues; but in most instances the other papers remained silent on the same issues.
This was also true of the news reports about HIV/AIDS in China, a topic covered quite extensively in the Guangzhou papers during the period of the study, but not at all in the Shanghai or Beijing papers. Some of the mainland newspapers carried stories about specific medical issues, including health care system failures, unlicensed doctors, and the production and sale of illegal medicines; but those in Shanghai, Beijing, and Chongqing carried no news reports or editorials about what the Western sources indicated was an urgent need for widespread medical reform, especially in the more remote parts of the countryside. There was some coverage of social problems and the inadequacies of different aspects of China's welfare system, but again it was diluted and sporadic in nature, with no significant emphasis on the need for new policies or the rethinking of existing policies. Overall, the mainland newspapers provide significantly less coverage of the social impacts of the reforms than the Western sources, and in many instances there is no coverage at all, with the notable exception of stories describing illegal medical practices in China.
Reports about corruption and crime in China were featured extensively in the mainland newspapers, almost as frequently as they were in the Western sources. It would appear that these topics are now considered to be appropriate for coverage in the daily papers of China's largest cities, perhaps because they are considered to be highly`readable', or perhaps because such stories are considered relatively safe and noncontroversial. The present regime has taken a hard line on corruption and crime, in part to prevent China from sliding into`chaos', which is generally considered to be its worst nightmare. To enforce the anticorruption and crime drive, the authorities are making widespread use of the harshest possible punishment (the death sentence) as a form of deterrence. According to official reports, not only does this appear to be working in China, but it is quite popular among the people (Sun and Yin, 2001) . In this sense the use of the press to inform the public about the extent of corruption and crime, and more importantly about the regime's efforts to stamp out the problem can be interpreted as an extension of state policy.
On the topic of`incomplete reform' there is very little difference between what was reported in the three Western sources and what appeared in the mainland newspapers. All of the topics generated in the inventory were reported in the mainland, and in most case with approximately the same frequency. This suggests that editors among this sample of city newspapers are willing to write about some of the problems associated with the incomplete nature of the reforms. It is possible that editorial decisions here are based, at least partly, on an assessment of what is needed to generate newspaper sales, and the resulting stories may include some reasonably critical analysis of government policy. It is also possible to interpret such reporting as another branch of state propaganda, in which the regime uses the media to let the people know that much work remains to be done, and that they will be called upon to make sacrifices in the future. This would be much closer to the role of`newspaper as mouthpiece' discussed earlier in this paper; the people, in this interpretation, are being prepared for the implementation of new measures that are vital to the ongoing success of the economic reforms. At this point it is virtually impossible to determine whether the reporting of controversial and/or sensitive issues is being driven primarily by commercial imperatives, or whether the press is being co-opted by the state to publish what it considers to be acceptable and in line with its overall policy goals.
The picture is significantly different when we examine the reporting on public`acts of resistance' in China. In general, the newspapers sampled contained only minimal coverage of such acts, with no reporting at all in most instances. The only notable exception to this was in the coverage of the activities of the Falun Gong group, both at home and abroad, and the`separatist' demonstrations associated with China's minority groups in the far west. On the most important issues, in other words those dealing with situations perceived to represent a direct threat to the regime, the state still exercises its right to control the output of the press. From the analysis presented here, and bearing in mind the small size of the sample, it appears that this is the case for most of the`acts of resistance' categories identified from the Western sources. On such issues the state may order a complete ban, or more likely in the case of Falun Gong, it may use the newspapers to publicize its views, or to exhort the people to criticize the movement and its followers.
There is some support in these findings for Lynch's (1999) proposition about the center's apparent loss of control over the communications system. Although the regime still manages the dissemination of very sensitive political information, in most other contexts its control is being challenged regularly, which results in a chaotic and unstructured system of communication (referred to by Lynch as`praetorian'). The results of this study suggest that we may now be looking at the early stages of this phenomenon, with city-level newspapers beginning to feel free enough (and interested enough in profitability) to print stories and write editorials they expect will be interesting enough to attract both their existing and new readers alike. At the same time, there is also evidence to suggest that such newspapers do not run stories that are considered by the state to be too`sensitive' or likely to cause embarrassment to the regime. Their silence on some issues, and their coverage of others, may be a result of directives from above, or a process of self-censorship in which editors choose between the lesser of two evils.
Freedom of the press in China
One of the major news items reported in the Western media during the year 2001 (after this study was completed), has been the issue of state censorship of the press. In the late summer of 2001 Beijing introduced a new set of directives that would significantly impact newspaper reporting and editorial decisionmaking. An official announcement was made that newspapers can be summarily closed down for reporting on any one of seven topics. The list of stories to be avoided has subsequently become known as thè Seven No's', which includes reports that: (1) negate the guiding role of Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, or Deng Xiaoping Theory; (2) oppose the guiding principles, official line, or policies of the Communist Party; (3) reveal state secrets, damage national security, or harm national interests; (4) oppose official policies regarding minority nationalities and religion, or harm national unity and affect social stability; (5) advocate murder, violence, obscenity, superstition, or pseudo-science; (6) spread rumors or falsified news, or interfere in the work of the Party and government; and (7) violate party propaganda discipline, or national publishing and advertising regulations.
The wide-ranging nature of the proscribed list gives the state the power to censor almost anything it feels is likely to upset the status quo, and the intention was to ban any criticism of government policies and any reporting that`harms the national interest'. Before the directive was announced by the State Press and Publications Administration, several publications had already been shut down and a number of reporters and editors were dismissed or demoted; with hundreds more shipped to Beijing to meet with propaganda officials to`study publicity directions'. In the August 2001 announcement the central government also warned that any province, autonomous region, or municipality in which two or more newspapers are closed down for violating one of these stipulations will not be allowed to launch any new publications in the following year (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2001) . It is too soon to know whether this new retrenchment is part of a long-term policy to clamp down on the press, or whether it is just part of the cyclical phenomena in which the state periodically tightens then relaxes its grip on society.
The issue of censorship of the press (and other media outlets) in China is one of the major concerns among insiders and outsiders alike, not just because it limits personal freedoms and the right to have one's voice heard in public, but also because of the heavy human cost of controlling information and political choice. One of the most important roles of the press in a democratic society is the so-called`watchdog' role. The 1980s had witnessed a lively debate on the issue of press reform in China, and at that time many journalists were beginning to define their goals as being largely investigative. Journalists were beginning to use their positions to expose examples of official and business misdeeds, in the hope that government follow-up actions would deal with the issues and prevent a recurrence.
In a recent article written for the New York Times, Erik Eckholm (2001) makes the point that a free and independent press might have been able to prevent much of the excess crime and corruption recently witnessed in China, and also some of the serious and often deadly social problems that are currently rampant. When reporters expose instances in which lies have been told, and cover-ups that have resulted in the loss of life and untold human misery, it is in everyone's interests that such cases are reported fully by the press. Speaking about the existence of corruption, Eckholm wrote that``If Chinese reporters had a longer leash, it would be inconceivable for a smuggling ring in the southern city of Xiamen to bribe hundreds of top customs, police and party officials for years without exposure.'' Discussing the tragedy in Henan Province in which many peasants became HIV positive after using untested blood products that were being sold on the open market, Eckholm noted that``If the people ... had freewheeling access to world news, they surely would have known well before 1995 that the injection of pooled, untested blood into people was asking for trouble.'' China's leaders insist that exposure of this sort is already occurring, and that people are certainly allowed to act as if they have rights and freedoms that must be protected. There was some evidence of this recently, when a schoolyard explosion killed dozens of children and teachers in a village in south China. Officials claimed that the school had been operating as a fireworks factory in a desperate effort by the local people to supplement their meager farm incomes. The villagers stood up in no uncertain terms to reject such a claim, which eventually produced an offer of resignation from the provincial governor, and a public retraction from China's Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (Liu and Yin, 2000) .
As this story demonstrates, progress is clearly being made in the direction of watchdog' journalism, but the fact that this event was only partially covered in mainland newspapers demonstrates there is still a long way to go. In a recent report issuing from Beijing, for example, it was reiterated that for the foreseeable future the Chinese media would remain the`mouthpiece' of the Communist Party regardless of changes in social and economic conditions (SCMP 2001) . A high-level propaganda official, Ding Guangen, was quoted in this report as saying that, although different media outlets can compete for readers in an expanding market, the state must maintain its control over the content of what is ultimately printed. Significantly, Ding chose the Beijing Youth Daily as the vehicle for circulating his remarks. This newspaper is one of a new class of commercial outlets that has been successful in drawing readers away from the traditionally wooden ideological vehicles like the People's Daily. By offering a colorful layout and lively reports about crime, sports, and economic successes, papers like the Beijing Youth Daily can increase circulation, while at the same time generally keeping close to the official line on political and social issues. As Ding points out the media must still``adhere to the Party's basic line, serve the people, socialism, and serve the work of the nation and Party.'' To achieve this, propaganda officials dictate the content of all news items, and suppress the reporting of sensitive political and social issues in all of the mainland's 2000 newspapers, 1800 television stations, and 300 radio stations.
Continuing research goals
The study reported here has established a baseline of observations with which to examine changes in the content of newspaper reporting in mainland China. Ideally, future research will include a fieldwork component to examine the relationship between locally existing discontent and the emergence of resistance in the form of public acts. This could be done for a sample of sites in different parts of China, where similar issues have resulted in very different outcomes. In this way it would be possible to examine the effect of news reporting within a locality, and to determine the extent to which press freedom plays a role in the evolution of resistance activities. Research of this type could offer some important pointers about the influence of the media on political attitudes and behaviors, as well as helping to monitor the progress of media reform in China.
One of the observations made here is that the problems encountered by the state as it tries to maintain control over the media grow more significant the lower down (or further away from Beijing) one goes in the system. The center, in other words, may be able to direct the activities occurring one level below itself, at the provincial level, where the behavior of certain key personnel can be monitored. But, even farther down the line and further from Beijingöin the cities, counties, townships, and villagesöit may be almost impossible for the center to control everything being reported in the media.
Another obvious geographical variable to explore in future research is the relationship between the location of the event in question and the reporting on that event. One of the news issues that was common during the study period, but not related to the economic reforms per se, involved the social impacts of the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, including stories about corruption and peasants being swindled out of what they thought was their due [literally being`sold down the river' by local officials (see Macleod, 2001) ]. The only daily newspaper (among those sampled) in the mainland that carried any stories about this issue was the Chongqing Daily, which is perhaps a result of geographic proximity, bearing in mind that the new dam will flood a huge area downriver from Chongqing, which is likely to have a tremendous physical and social impact on the city.
An alternative geographical hypothesis emerges from observations made in other recent reports highlighted in the Western media sources. Contrary to the proximity effect noted above, there is some evidence of news`blackouts' in the vicinity of places where accidents or other catastrophic events are reported. This appears to have been the case for some of the mining accidents that have been occurring with alarming frequency in many parts of China, which have been covered up successfully by the local and provincial authorities, until some very persistent local reporters bring them to light (Beach, 2001) . Under normal circumstances the Chinese government does not support journalists who try to search out the truth behind an official cover-up, and, although the official line of the state is that journalists are meant to act as`watchdogs' over society, in reality they may be harassed, dismissed, and sometimes sent to prison for doing their job with too much zeal. In many cases local officials are held responsible for illegal activities in their districts, so they may not be eager for negative reports to appear in the immediate vicinity of the event in question. This is especially the case if deaths are involved, and where provincial or county leaders are likely to be held responsible. In spite of such local cover-ups, news about serious mining (or other) accidents has a tendency to leak out, suggesting that the activities of journalists, and the nature of what can be reported in the press, have expanded significantly during the last decade. This appears to be most likely if the story being suppressed is judged to have all the ingredients of a salacious and eminently readable news story.
In the more general context of public acts of resistance, it might also be possible to examine the assumption that political dissidence generally becomes more widespread during times of increasing liberalization, a phenomenon referred to as thè Tocqueville paradox' by Minxin Pei (1998a) . From this perspective resistance is more likely to occur in the relatively relaxed era of the economic reforms than during the extreme repressiveness of the Maoist era; but on a smaller scale it is also likely that resistance may have a cyclical nature, increasing in prevalence as political circumstances change in the direction of further liberalization. From this perspective we might optimistically consider the announcement of the`Seven No's' restrictions in the summer of 2001 to be a temporary reversal of what might be a long-term trend in the direction of increased liberalization of the press (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2001).
In spatial terms we would normally expect resistance acts to be more prevalent, and probably reported more frequently and accurately in regions (or cities) where economic growth has been extremely rapid and wealth has accumulated significantly. This suggests that both the prevalence of resistance and the frequency of reporting about resistance activities may be a function of the extent of economic and social progress that has already been attained in a particular region. The reverse of this hypothesis also has some merit, however: resistance acts might be more likely in regions where economic development is significantly below the national average and where lower incomes, lost jobs, and reduced opportunities raise the overall level of public discontent. In reality we may well find that acts of resistance are occurring in both situations, perhaps taking a different form, and in future research it might be possible to examine this idea more fully.
In addition to the overtly political and legal activities discussed in this paper under the headings of`reform-induced problems' and`acts of resistance', it is also apparent that the Chinese are beginning to represent this period of tumultuous change, and perhaps their discontent with various aspects of it, in symbolic terms, through their cultural productions (Huot, 2000; Zhang, 1997) . What is implied here is a domain of resistance that is not necessarily expressed in words spoken out loud or acts performed in public spaces; but through more nuanced channels, including works of art and literature, as Jing Wang (1996) has shown in her book High Culture Fever. The Italian political scientist Antonio Gramsci observed that subcultures and other groups involved in cultural productions can actively offer pockets of resistance to the dominant social order, the state, by``expressing their dissatisfaction symbolically through style'' (Barme¨, 1999, page xvi) . Following Gramsci's lead here, we might suspect that one outlet for expressing resistance is within the domain of popular culture, especially through the media of television and film (Rogoff, 2000; Silbergeld, 1999) . We can assume that the Chinese want to tell the rest of the world about their experiences with modernization and the penetration of capital into the mainland, and, in the absence of a free press, cultural productions are already proving to be an effective outlet (Donald, 2000) . The state may continue to throw up roadblocks by censoring the press and limiting access to the Internet, but in the not-too-distant future it may be the market that proves to be the most subversive, as cultural productions become the latest in a long line of`made in China' commodities for Westerners to acquire and consume.
